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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 117 
CIVIL PROCEDURE-JUDGMENTS-EFFECT OF PRIOR "COMPROMISE" JUDG-
MENT AS COLLATERAL ESTOPP~L-In a negligence action for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident, one of three successful plaintiffs was 
granted a new trial because damages awarded her were inadequate. In the 
new trial the issue of negligence was relitigated over plaintiff's objection 
that the question of liability was res judicata. The jury found for the de-
fendant and plaintiff appealed. Held, affirmed, one justice dissenting. Al-
though the judgment in favor of the other two plaintiffs in the prior action 
establishing defendant's liability has become final, this prior judgment is 
not res judicata. Since the judgment was entered pursuant to a verdict 
which was evidently a compromise among the jurors, the jury failed to 
determine the issue of liability. Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. (2d) 893, 
306 P. (2d) 797 (1957). _ 
Although early common law cases held that a verdict could be set 
aside only in its entirety and a new trial granted only on all issues,1 the 
leading case of Simmons v. Fish2 recognized the court's power to grant a 
new trial on less than all the issues. The court recognized that in some 
cases issues are distinct and separable and the error on which a new trial 
is founded may not affect other elements of the verdict.3 Today a majority 
of the states, either by statute, court rule,4 or case law,5 have adopted the 
general proposition that a partial new trial can be granted, usually at the 
discretion of the trial judge. 6 An important exception to this power has 
been carved out by some states.7 California in particular has consistently 
held it an abuse of discretion by the trial court to grant a new trial on the 
issue of damages alone when the verdict was evidently a compromise be-
tween the jurors.8 For example, when damages awarded are so grossly 
inadequate as to suggested that the jury compromised on the question of 
liability in order to reach agreement, any new trial granted must be as to 
all the issues including liability, and cannot be confined to the question 
of damages. This was the situation in the principal case, and the court did 
not find the contention of res judicata sufficiently persuasive to change 
lSee discussion by Rugg, J., in Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563 at 564, 97 N.E. 102 
(1912). 
2 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912). 
s The court cautioned that this practice should be limited to the narrow situation 
in which separability is beyond question. Id. at 568. See Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. 
Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269 (1915). 
4 E.g., Rule 59, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952); Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) 
§21-1310; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1939) §657; Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., (Col. Rev. 
Stat. 1953) c. 6, rule 59 [relied on in Belcaro Realty Inv. Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 
87 P. (2d) 1114 (1939)); Miss. S. Ct. Rule 12, 161 Miss. 903 at 905 (1931). 
5 See cases collected in 29 A.L.R. (2d) 1199 at 1203 (1953). 
6 E.g., •Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. (2d) 462, 247 P. (2d) 324 (1952); 29 A.L.R. (2d) 
1185 (1953); Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal. (2d) 481, 247 P. (2d) 335 (1952). 
7 Ibid.; Hendrickson v. Koppers Co., 11 N.J. 600, 95 A. (2d) 710 (1953). 
8 See note 6 supra. Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal. (2d) 602, 240 P. (2d) 298 (1952), affd. 
on reh. 248 P. (2d) 910 (1952); Cary v. Wentzel, 39 Cal. (2d) 491, 247 P. (2d) 341 (1952). 
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the usual result,9 despite a well supported dissent. The conflict which faced 
the court was between equally well-established rules. Had the present 
plaintiff been the only plaintiff in the first action, there is no question 
that under California procedure10 and case Iaw11 she would be precluded 
from obtaining a new trial on the question of damages only. On the other 
hand, had the verdict in the first suit not been reached through a compro-
mise of the jurors, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would prevent the de-
fendant from relitigating the question of his liability in a new trial. The 
court's solution of this problem is not easy to accept, particularly since un-
der California law both a consent judgment12 and a default judgment13 may 
give rise to a collateral estoppel. The principal case seems quite analogous 
to the former, especially if the parties in the original action by failing 
to move for a new trial accepted, as the Court suggests, "the jury's com-
promise as their own."14 The court's argument that the jury "failed to 
determine the issue of liability"15 is therefore not persuasive for, by allow-
ing the judgment to stand, the defendant accepted its determination of 
his liability to the same extent as in a consent judgment. The court's de-
cision appears to be based upon the policy consideration that the defend-
ant, subjected to the possibility of increased damages, should also have 
an opportunity to escape liability. He refused such an opportunity once, 
however, by failing to move for a new trial in the first action. It would 
therefore seem that while sound policy may support refusal of partial new 
trials after a "compromise" verdict involving one plaintiff and one de-
fendant, it should not be used to carve out an exception to the rules of 
collateral estoppel. 
Peter H. Hay, S. Ed. 
9 Raqiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154, 200 S. 376 (1941), presented a similar 
fact situation, but the issue of res judicata was never raised. 
10 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1939) §657. 
11 Leipert v. Honold, note 6 supra. See also 29 A.L.R. (2d) 1119 (1953). 
12 Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 12 P. 480 (1886). 
13 Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal. (2d) 579, 116 P. (2d) 605 (1941). 
14 Principal case at 896. 
15lbid. 
